and naval fleets. With the beginning of naval modernization in the 1860's, the establishment of a naval shipyard and academy at Foochow enabled natives of Fukien to gain a nepotistic monopoly on the Chinese navy. It was under the command of Sah (Sa) Chen-ping, whose home was in Foochow, during the last years of the Ch'ing Dynasty. He maintained control even after his retirement until his death in 1951, opportunistically placing the navy at the service of the Republic, various warlords, the Nationalist Government, and the Communist regime.[22]

Another use to which the people of Fukien put their seamanship and fighting ability was piratical raiding of rich farming and trade centers within access of the sea, particularly the area around the Yangtze estuary. During the Ming Dynasty (1368 to 1644), the natives of Fukien along with Japanese and persons of mixed ancestry operating from bases in Japan constituted a serious menace to the people and wealth of coastal China. When the foreign havens of the freebooters were eliminated by Japan's self-isolation at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the raiders continued their forays from Chinese offshore islands and isolated inlets in Fukien and northern Kwangtung.

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22. Percy Finch, Shanghai and Beyond, New York, Charles Scribners' Sons, 1953, pp. 127-28.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF15 East China
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579 One of the most famous of these pirates was Cheng Chih-lung, a native of Fukien who had married a Japanese woman. He was eventually persuaded by the Ming court to give up his freebooting and accept the official position of guarding the coast against pirates and Dutch traders. His even more famous son, Cheng Ch'eng-kung, is known to the West as Koxinga. In the service of the Ming Dynasty, he gained esteem by defending his home province against the invading Manchus until forced by superior numbers to retire to Formosa. After driving out the Dutch traders who had seized it as a center for commerce with China, he used the island as a base from which to mount raids against the Chinese coast. So great was the menace he, and his son after him, posed to the new ruling Ch'ing Dynasty (1644 to 1912), that it ordered the depopulation of the Chinese coast from Shantung south. The order was most strictly enforced in Fukien, undoubtedly because of the sympathy, aid, and bases Koxinga and his forces might expect to find there. Only in 1683 was habitation of the Fukien coast again permitted by imperial order.[23]

175 H. The Rise of the Ming Dynasty

The last native dynasty to rule China, the Ming (1368 to 1644), was a product of the lower Yangtze area of the East China Region. Its founder, Chu Yüan-chang, was the son of

23. Cf. A.W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, Vol. I, Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, 1944, pp. 108-11; and Latourette, op. cit., pp. 310, 331-32.

2: Murphy G-4 (no date) 1953 AF15 East China AF15

ment of rice by water to Shanghai. This last has the greatest effect on the rice market. In general, the Shanghai price of rice tends to rise at New Year about 5 per cent and at other festival times a little less. The above effects of festival periods also demonstrate the leading position of local rice supplies, since the entire Shanghai rice market (including the price of foreign rice imports) reacts at these times to purely local festival activities. Local rice being in short supply, foreign rice is at a premium.

5. Civil disturbances. Movement of local rice to Shanghai is notably interfered with during periods of local unrest, especially when troop movements occur. The boatmen fear commandeering of their boats and expropriation of the cargoes. This was a frequent occurrence during the unsettled political period of the late 1920's, and later during the Japanese attacks on Shanghai in 1932 and 1937, as well presumably as the wartime period and the large-scale civil war which shortly followed it. Civil order has unfortunately not been the rule in this area during the past thirty years. In October 1926, despite an excellent harvest just gathered, large amounts of rice already in storage in Shanghai and the accumulated demand in the city after the mid-autumn festival, a local uprising in Chekiang and troop movements connected with it in Kiangsu brought water transport to a complete halt in the delta south and west of Soochow. As a result, the Shanghai price of rice nearly doubled instead of falling as it otherwise would have done. The railways to Hangchow and Nanking were kept open during the entire period. In this case the rice supply situation was eased by shipments on special order from Tsingpu, Sungchiang, and other nearby areas removed from the trouble.*

* Rice was stored both in Shanghai and in the collection centers in the local producing areas. However, the Shanghai rice market was very sensitive to day-to-day changes in the supply arriving from the local areas. This suggests that relatively small amounts of rice were stored in Shanghai, and that the market depended on regular shipments. When these were interfered with, it was not possible for the Shanghai rice merchants to keep the Shanghai price from rising, since orders for foreign rice could not normally be delivered in less than two weeks. The hiatus in local supplies during the planting season was of course anticipated by the Shanghai merchants in the form of advance orders for foreign rice which were delivered during May and June, but even so the price of rice rose during this period, as indicated above, further evidence that the market was dominated by local supplies moving regularly to the city during most of the year.

2: Murphy G-4 (no date) 1953 AF15 East China AF15

439 of Shanghai's rice consumption of something like one billion
435 pounds over the year as a whole. The supply situation was determined by price, and foreign rice was imported not necessarily because local rice was unobtainable but because its Shanghai price at certain periods rose considerably above the Shanghai price of foreign rice.

The price problem posed by the hiatus in local supply during the planting season might have been overcome without bringing in foreign rice, by carefully planned advance buying and by distributing price fluctuations for local rice more widely over the year as a whole. This solution was theoretically in the power of the Shanghai rice merchants, and it has since been applied at least to a degree by the Communist Government (see Chapter Eleven). But it is doubtful whether Shanghai could have existed without foreign rice imports during the periods of civil war and floods which disrupted its water connections with the producing areas. At such times, a high enough price in Shanghai could presumably have attracted to the city from the local areas adequate rice to feed its population despite the difficulties and dangers of water transport, but workers' families and other low-income groups, which constituted the great majority of the population, would have been priced out of the market.

722 The situation after 1936 was complicated by the Japanese invasion
439 and conquest of the delta in 1937. Japanese military requisitions drained off increasing amounts of the delta's rice crop, and fighting over the area reduced total production and hampered the movement of rice to Shanghai. The city became increasingly dependent on foreign imports of rice, and by 1940 relied almost entirely on what it was able to import from Saigon. The unsettled political situation, in which the foreign settlements remained until Pearl Harbor in theory outside Japanese control but increasingly subject to Japanese influence and threatened with total absorption, en-
435 couraged hoarding and speculation. Curtailment of local supplies created an actual shortage, and these factors together resulted in a tripling of the Shanghai price of rice between 1936 and 1941.

[577] Rice riots in the city became frequent, and Shanghai's normal dependence on its local rice supply areas was increasingly borne in upon all of the cities population.

3: Hinder G-5 (1933-1942) 1944 AF15 East China AF15

[625] tended towards the simple formula of taking the line of least
468 resistance by requiring that workers return to work before media-
633 tion was undertaken. But workers who, having struck, went back to work, were workers weakened in their struggle. It must not be thought from this that there was any truckling to workers. The mediation officers did not hesitate to state when, in their view, the demands of labour were unreasonable. Equally the viewpoint of management was taken into account. Where it was reasonable it was supported; where it was thought there should be concessions the management was frankly told so. No pressure, however, was brought either to induce workers to resume before they were satisfied that they had obtained the best possible adjustment of their claims, or to induce management to make a settlement which it would regret.

The work of the Industrial Relations Section of the Division became partly mediating, and, as time went on, increasingly consultative. Both workers and management frequently sought advice on their situations before an open break occurred, and a final breach was more frequently avoided than not. But workers were not restrained by the Division from striking, if without the exercise of this instrument they could not obtain a just hearing for their demands. Nor was management, if workers proved unreasonable, over-persuaded not to use the weapon of lockout.

468 VIOLENCE SOMETIMES accompanied labour disputes. When work-
625 ers refused to leave the plant, "sat down," or even locked up the
579 management, then the police had to be called in. Every effort was made to avoid clashes with workers, but there were occasions when the police officer in charge believed it necessary to clear the plant. Workers then might seize any handy missile, from iron bars to bricks or garbage, with which they attempted to resist the police. In one strike early in 1941 the management permitted the men to enter the plant each morning for three days and to leave it each evening, without having done any work, in an effort to avoid the necessity for calling in the police. Meantime negotiations were attempted. When on the morning of the fourth day workers tried to enter the compound armed with iron rods, they were prevented from doing so, and the police were informed. In an ensuing melée many workers and policemen were injured, some workers fatally.

3: Hinder G-5 (1933-1942) 1944 AF15 East China AF15

1935 there were 38,915 foreign residents, of more than fifty nationalities. In 1870 at the time of the first census of the foreign population, foreign residents had numbered 1,666, and 6,774 in 1900.

Normally 1940 should have seen the taking of the quinquennial census which had been carried out regularly since the initial years mentioned above. The Council, however, decided to dispense with census-taking in that year. Police, with whose assistance the distribution and collection of census papers were accomplished, were preoccupied in combating serious armed terroristic activities. Moreover, Chinese members of the Shanghai Municipal Police had not completely resumed their former duties in the area of the Settlement north of Soochow Creek, in which Japanese military authorities continued to exercise military functions, and without police help census-taking was not possible. Great congestion persisted in the area south of Soochow Creek, but as a result of the destruction of many dwellings in 1937 during the fighting north of the Creek, the congestion per unit area there was less than formerly. The 1942 count of heads provided none of the usual additional information sought by a Settlement census. Hence it is necessary to rely on 1935 figures.

What was the population density in 1935? The basis of computation was the number of persons per unit area—in this case the number per acre. In the most densely populated police district, the figure was 547 per acre; a figure of more than 300 per acre obtained in nineteen police districts. A non-scientific, but for the average person a revealing, method would be to state the average numbers of persons and families per house, even though the size of the houses might vary.[3] Actually there is a certain uniformity in

[3] COMPARISONS OF CHINESE POPULATION AND HOUSE OCCUPANCY (at five-yearly periods)

Year	Chinese Population	Chinese Houses	
		Occupied	Unoccupied
1935	1,120,860	74,952	6,967
1930	971,397	72,686	1,509
1925	810,279	65,474	2,357
1920	759,859	60,472	517
1915	620,401	54,083	1,856
1910	488,005	47,703	4,505
1905	452,716	44,316	1,012
1900	345,276	36,902	6,021
1895	240,995	29,851	800
1890	168,129	21,976	1,508
1885	115,170	18,513	3,064
1880	99,196	16,285	1,158

3: Hinder G-5 (1933-1942) 1944 AF15 East China AF15

ing of the treaty with Nanking on November 30, 1940, it was announced that high Japanese military authorities in Nanking had agreed that, subject to meeting the needs of the army and with certain other reservations, rice collection should be a function of the Chinese authorities. Actually little Chinese rice was made available to Shanghai.

There were ample stocks of rice in Burma, but there were no ships to bring it to Shanghai. This was well known, not only to rice dealers in Shanghai, but to the general public. Therefore, despite the presence of a large reserve supply in the warehouses of the city, the retail price of rice rose at an accelerating rate until in May 1941, as a result of private profiteering and public fear, it reached the till then unprecedented height of $145 per *shih*.

It can readily be understood that with such difficulties in feeding the Settlement, major emphasis had to be placed on ensuring supplies. Even though high prices were undesirable, it was important that there should be supply at any price. Rice riots have occurred more than once since 1937.

The distressing effects of high prices were illustrated by the practice of "rice sweeping" (and, indeed, the snatching of other commodities such as raw cotton) which became a frequent sight in the city as a consequence of the rising prices. When a truckload of rice halted at a traffic intersection, a dozen waifs, adult and adolescent, appeared from nowhere, moving like lightning. In a twinkling one or more rice bags were pierced with knives, and as the precious grain began to run out, it was scooped swiftly with the dust of the roadway into a receptacle. The "sweeper" would often disappear before any police could act. But if caught, he or she appeared next morning in the First Special District Court, that busy court which dealt with an average of 10,000 cases each month. Detention followed; but the need that prompted the snatching remain unfilled.

ALTHOUGH IN THE CRISIS of 1937 the Shanghai Municipal Council had intervened to bring rice to Shanghai, it had no desire to interfere with the normal trade in rice unless forced by circumstances to do so. When faced with the crisis in March 1941, therefore, the Council decided that it would charter ships, possibly with the assistance of the British Admiralty. Space could then be sold to rice importers. At the end of March the Council announced this intention and appointed a special committee of businessmen under